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DECENTRALIZATION OF METROPOLITAN
GOVERNMENT: REFORM IN INDIANAPOLIS
In every city the people are divided into three sorts; the
very rich, the very poor and those who are between them....
The most perfect political community must be amongst those
who are in the middle rank, and those states are best in-
stituted wherein these are a large and more respectable part,
if possible, than both the other; or, if that cannot be, at least
than either of them separate; so that being thrown into the
balance it may prevent either scale from preponderating.
-Aristotle, Politics, Book IV,
Chapter XI, pp. 126-27.
I. INTRODUCTION
The local government of Indianapolis-Marion County, Indiana,
has recently undergone a major reorganization. As of January 1,
1970, the Indianapolis city limits were expanded to the Marion
County lines, and a new unified legislative and executive structure
replaced the old city, county, and special district authorities.1 The
enactment was prompted by many of the same problems facing all
urban centers. The form of city-county consolidation is also much
the same as that adopted by other centralizing areas. Yet, the
Indianapolis scheme is unique because of a proposal, 2 introduced
with the consolidation bill in 1969 and re-introduced in the 1971
Indiana General Assembly, designed to solve the inevitable prob-
lems of citizen isolation from a large metropolitan government.
MINIGOV, as the proposal is called, is an attempt to decentral-
ize local government by giving certain powers and responsibilities
to community councils, popularly elected from small homo-
geneous neighborhoods. While MINIGOV does not give ultimate
political control to local communities, it is one of the first plans
which recognizes the need to stimulate community influence in a
broad range of governmental questions.
This note will deal first with the reasons for centralization of
local governments and how certain cities, especially Indianapolis,
have achieved that goal. The issue of involving smaller commu-
nities in the solution to urban problems will then be discussed,
first in the context of certain objections to the Indianapolis con-
' IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 48-9101 to 48-9507 (1969).
2 [1969] Ind. House Bill No. 1921.
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solidation, then in the context of the achievement record of com-
munity development corporations, and finally with relation to
MINIGOV itself. Part IV will consider specific sections of the
MINIGOV bill dealing with citizen participation in land use
planning and development, and Part V will more broadly compare
the Indianapolis scheme to other proposals for a "two-tiered"
local government.
II. THE NEED FOR CENTRALIZATION
A. Problems of Fragmented Local Governments
While Indianpolis provides one of the most recent examples of
major urban governmental reform, metropolitan government has
been adopted by a few urban areas and has been proposed for
many more.3 These plans seem to be motivated by a common
realization that area-wide problems can only be solved by a polit-
ical unit that can draw together the resources of the entire com-
munity for common planning and action. While it is difficult to
generalize about the weaknesses in local governments that have
prevented such a coordinated attack on urban problems, one
committee4 has listed several contributing factors: (1) many local
units of government are too small in terms of population and area,
and have such insufficient sources of tax revenue, that effective
treatment of major urban problems which extend beyond arbitrary
political boundaries is impossible; (2) often, fragmented author-
ities, such as independent school districts, municipalities and
townships within counties, and a plethora of special districts com-
pete for tax revenues without any coordinated planning, (3) result-
ing partly from the multitude of governmental bodies and lower
political offices, voters are confused by local government and are
increasingly apathetic; (4) the multitude of elected officials con-
tributes to weak policy-making mechanisms that further inhibit
long-range planning; and (5) administrative organizations, lacking
a single executive authority, often are so disorganized and func-
tionally fragmented that even the most elementary organizational
concepts employed by business firms may be totally absent from
local government.
Another author has described the need for centralized authority
3 See U.S. ADVISORY COMM. ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, ALTERNATIVE
APPROACHES TO GOVERNMENTAL REORGANIZATION IN METROPOLITAN AREAS (1962).
4 COMM. FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, MODERNIZING LOCAL GOVERNMENT 11-13
(1966). The CED is composed of two hundred leading businessmen and educators and is
supported by voluntary contributions from business and industry. The CED develops
policy statements and other research products as guides to public and business policy.
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within the metropolitan area in fundamentally the same terms by
listing three benefits of consolidation: first, efficiency in the utili-
zation of area-wide resources by a governmental unit having met-
ropolitan, rather than merely city or suburban, responsibilities;
second, further economic efficiency resulting from the elimination
of overlapping jurisdictions and operations; and third, more ratio-
nal planning and capital expenditures.
5
The problems of transportation, pollution, employment and
housing simply do not end at the central city limits. Although
urban areas have attempted to meet the problems by creating
single-purpose service districts with area-wide authority, this solu-
tion often results in a confusing amalgamation of districts and
boards, each having a limited perspective when integrated ap-
proaches are required.6 Several urban areas have attempted to
achieve integrated solutions by creating multi-purpose metropol-
itan districts, often approaching the form of general metropolitan
government. One of the first such plans was Metropolitan To-
ronto.7 Often frustrated in attempts to solve complex urban prob-
lems as thirteen individual municipalities, Toronto in 1953
adopted a so-called "federated" form of metropolitan government.
The new Metropolitan Council was composed of twenty-four
members, equally divided between city and suburbs, each member
deriving his seat by virtue of holding office in his own municipal-
ity. The local municipalities retained primary autonomy; however,
the new "metropolitan" level of government was given specified
responsibilities for services that transcended the boundaries of the
individual municipalities, such as finance, water and sewage sys-
tems, transportation and parks. In 1957, police and licensing
functions were added to the responsibilities of the Metropolitan
Corporation, and amendments enacted in 1966 reorganized the
Metropolitan Council" and expanded metropolitan responsibility
to include education, welfare, and refuse collection and disposal.
5 Note, The Urban County: A Study Of New Approaches To Local Government In
Metropolitan Areas, 73 HARV. L. REV. 526, 527 (1960).
6 For a general treatment of the subject of special service districts, see J. BOLLENS,
SPECIAL DISTRICT GOVERNMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 91 (1957).
7 The material which follows on Toronto is drawn from H. KAPLAN, URBAN POLITICAL
SYSTEMS: A FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF METRO TORONTO (1967); Rose, A Decade of
Metropolitan Government in Toronto, 13 BUFF. L. REV. 539 (1964); Milner, The Metro-
politan Toronto Plan, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 570 (1957); and COMM. FOR ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT, RESHAPING GOVERNMENT IN METROPOLITAN AREAS, 70-83 (1970).
8 The thirteen municipalities were consolidated into five boroughs and one city, repre-
sentatives on the Metropolitan Council being elected from those political subdivisions on a
representative population basis. The size of the Council was enlarged to thirty-two. What
was previously a city-suburban split of 12-12 is now 20-12 in favor of the suburbs. The
Executive Committee, however, maintains a 5-5 division.
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Miami-Dade County, Florida, 9 in 1957 adopted a variant of the
federated form of government where an elected Board of County
Commissioners was invested with area-wide powers. Although
the twenty-seven municipalities involved retained their identity
and control over "local" matters, Metro was given responsibility
for transportation, health, welfare, parks, pollution control, urban
renewal, and flood and beach control. Thus, Miami has a
pseudo-federal system in which government is shared by the
county and the municipalities.
Another approach to metropolitan government, the one ulti-
mately chosen by Indianapolis, is a city-county consolidation in
which previously fragmented local governments within the urban
county are united into one political unit. Miami-Dade County has
some of the elements of city-county consolidation since Metro
extends county-wide and officials are elected county-wide. How-
ever, a better example is Baton Rouge-East Baton Rouge Parish,
Louisiana, which in 1947 established interlocking city and parish
governments. 10 The seven city countil members and two persons
elected from the rural areas constitute the parish council, presided
over by a mayor-president who is elected parish-wide. While the
city limits were expanded to encompass the entire urban area, all
services were not thus extended, and the citizens of those areas
not receiving services are not required to contribute to their cost.
Consequently different areas of the new city receive different
services and hence pay different tax rates.11 These special tax and
service differentials were similarly incorporated into the more
recent city-county consolidations in Nashville-Davidson County,
Tennessee, in 1962,12 and Jacksonville-Duval County, Florida, in
9 FLA. CONST. art. Vill,§ 6 is the home rule amendment, and provides for the
Miami-Dade County Charter. For a more detailed explanation and history of the Miami
plan, see J. BOLLENS & H. SCHMANDT, THE METROPOLIS: ITS PEOPLE, POLITICS, AND
ECONOMIC LIFE 459-477 (1965); and E. SOFEN, THE MIAMI METROPOLITAN EXPERIMENT
(1963). See, The Urban County: A Study of New Approaches to Local Government in
Metropolitan Areas, supra note 5, for a survey of the literature on metropolitan govern-
ment and a discussion of the Miami-Dade County plan.
1o LA. CONST. art. 14, § 3(a). SeeJ. BOLLENS & H. SCHMANDT, supra note 9, at 430-33.
11 The parish was divided into three zones: urban, industrial, and rural. The city
government provides police and fire protection, garbage and refuse collection, street
lighting, traffic regulation, sewerage, and inspectional services in the urban area, and
residents pay both city and parish taxes. City-type services needed in industrial areas are
provided by the industries at their own expense. The rural zone cannot receive city-type
services (except the services of the sheriffs department) and residents pay only parish
taxes, for which they receive bridges, highways, streets, sidewalks, and airports.
12 TENN. CONST. art. 11, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 6-3701 to 3725 (1970); and [1961]
Tenn. Priv. Acts, ch. 408. See J. BOLLENS & H. SCHMANDT, supra note 9, at 433-34. The
new county-wide government consists of an elected mayor and a forty-member metropoli-
tan county council, five of whom are elected at large, thirty-five elected from districts.
Recognizing that full municipal services simply could not be extended to everyone in the
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1967.13 Attempts by certain municipalities to replace fragmented
authority with metropolitan government assuming various duties
and responsibilities throughout the urban area have been moti-
vated by different political forces and different practical necessi-
ties within the urban areas. No two cities have developed identi-
cal governments. Each of the cities has recognized, however, that
a unified legislative and executive structure is necessary if ratio-
nal, coordinated decision-making is to be achieved.
B. UNIGOV: City-County Consolidation
Indianapolis, like other cities, has been moving toward central-
ization for years as individual municipal functions were trans-
ferred to boards having county-wide authority.14 The resulting
web of special service districts and autonomous boards and com-
missions became so complex and overlapping that attempts to
rationally administer urban programs seemed almost hopeless.
15
For example, before consolidation there were eight different au-
thorities responsible for drainage and water problems, and five
such authorities for transportation. Coordination became almost
impossible-confusion and conflict the rule.
These conditions prompted the 1969 Indiana Legislature to
pass a proposal, dubbed "UNIGOV" by the press, which unifies
governments in Indianapolis-Marion County. 16 While the UNI-
GOV bill is lengthy, complex, and filled with compromises and
exceptions,1 7 it in essence provides for an extension of the In-
dianapolis city limits to the Marion County lines, with a govern-
county immediately, the drafters established a two-district arrangement, one of the districts
consisting of the old city and the other extending county-wide. Functions financed only in
the urban services district include fire protection, intensified police protection, sewage
disposal, water supply, and street lighting, while those performed and financed area-wide
include schools, public health, police, courts, public welfare, public housing, urban renew-
.al, streets and roads, libraries, waste disposal and code enforcement.
13 The plan is much like that of Nashville, in that there is an elected mayor, a nine-
teen-member council (fourteen by districts and five at large), and tax and service
differentials. In the case of Jacksonville, the services furnished county-wide include air-
ports, courts, fire protection, hospitals, police protection, recreation and parks, schools,
transportation, and welfare services. See FLA. CONST. art. VIll, § 6 and [1967] Fla. Spec.
Acts, Ch. 1320.
1
4 See generally U.S. ADVISORY COMM. ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, THE
PROBLEM OF SPECIAL DISTRICTS IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1964).
15 Lawrence & Turnbull, "UNIGOV," POPULAR GOVERNMENT, Nov. 1969, at 19. This
is a thorough study of the reasons for consolidation in Indianapolis, the form it has taken,
and some of the problems it has caused.
16 IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 48-9101 to 48-9507 (1969).
17 E.g., schools are completely unaffected by the Act. Five of the six executive directors
are subject to removal by the Mayor, but the Director of the Department of Metropolitan
Development is not. See infra note 25 for special service district boundaries which are
unaffected by UNIGOV.
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ment to be composed of a mayor, six executive departments, and
a twenty-nine member city-county council. When fully operative
in January 1972, fifty-eight previously existing boards and com-
missions will be consolidated into six executive departments: 8
Administration, Metropolitan Development, Public Works,
Transportation, Public Safety, and Parks and Recreation. Each
department will be headed by a director19 responsible to and
appointed by a popularly-elected mayor.
20
The most important change created by UNIGOV, and the one
most often cited by its supporters, is the consolidation of the city
and county legislative bodies. 21 The new combined City-County
Council will consist of twenty-five representatives elected from
districts and four representatives elected at large. 22 The UNI-
GOV bill explicitly provides that the districts shall be equal in
population, compact in configuration, and created by ordinance of
the City-County Council.23 The City-County Council is the met-
ropolitan area's primary legislative body, having the power to
approve budgets, to levy general or special taxes, and to make
appropriations for the consolidated city.2 4 Tax and service
differentials, which have characterized recent city-county con-
solidations in other cities, are included in the Indianapolis scheme
by leaving certain special service district boundaries the same.2
Even in these instances, however, the Council's fiscal authority
extends to many of the independent agencies and boards whose
powers and duties were not changed by consolidation. 26 In other
words, for the first time, legislative authority is vested in a popu-
larly elected representative body that is empowered to review the
actions of previously autonomous bonding and taxing units.
18 IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 48-9311 to 48-9481 (1969).
19 Id. § 48-9303.
20 Id. § 48-9204.
21 Before UNIGOV, the City Council consisted of nine members elected at large, and
the County Council consisted of five members who were also elected at large. These men
will serve on the interim City-County Council until the first municipal elections in 1971.
22 IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-9206 (1969).
23 Id. § 48-9208.
24 Id. § 48-9224.
25 The police, fire and sanitation districts remain as they were before consolidation,
generally restricted to the old city limits. However, provision is made for extending those
services when desired by the residents of outlying areas or when economically feasible.
Furthermore, citizens pay only for the services they receive, and only council members
fr m the relevant urban districts will vote on decisions affecting the districts, except for the
f ur at large members who vote on everything.
28The City-County Council, for example, has the right to review and modify the
operating and maintenance budgets and the tax levies of the authorities responsible for
airports, health and hospitals, and libraries. These functions were already performed
county-wide, but were operated by semi-autonomous boards.
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III. THE NEED FOR DECENTRALIZATION
A. Opposition to UNIGOV
Although a primary purpose of UNIGOV was to make city
government more responsive to the electorate by fixing respon-
sibility for governmental services with a highly-visible mayor and
city-county council, and notwithstanding the relative ease with
which UNIGOV passed the state legislature, 27 UNIGOV en-
counters continued opposition from groups as diverse as the John
Birch Society and black militants.2 8 On the one hand, white sub-
urbanites who have fled from the problems of the inner city in the
past two decades do not view with favor the possibility of finding
themselves once again faced with the prospects of higher taxes,
public housing in their neighborhoods, and problems of racial
integration. 29 On the other hand, inner city residents, many of
them black, see the extension of the city limits to the county line
as an attempt to dilute their voting strength and political power.
They view their chances of electing a black government as having
been greatly diminished. Although black residents comprised
twenty-six per cent of the old city population, under UNIGOV it
has been reduced to only sixteen per cent.
30
The black opposition also asserts that the establishment of four
27 While the recent city-county consolidations in Miami, Nashville, and Jacksonville
were in part prompted by municipal bankruptcy or scandal, the Indianapolis-Marion
County consolidation was passed relatively quickly with an absence of major political
turmoil. CITY, June, 1969, at 37.
28 Two complaints are rather universal. The first is that voters were not given a chance
by referendum to approve or reject the bill. In Indiana, cities are the creatures of the state
legislature and major structural reform must be achieved by act of that body. Supporters of
the bill replied, therefore, that since a referendum has no binding legal effect, the cost of a
two-year delay (the Indiana Legislature meets once every two years) would have been
senseless. Supporters also point to the fact that the fifty-man advisory group that drew up
the UNIGOV bill represented all segments of the community and that the numerous
changes and compromises which were embodied in the final form represented considerable
citizen input. See generally U.S. ADVISORY COMM. ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS,
FACTORS AFFECTING VOTER REACTIONS TO GOVERNMENTAL REORGANIZATION IN MET-
ROPOLITAN AREAS (1962), especially the summary of conclusions at 24-33.
The second complaint is purely political. A Republican mayor-the first since
1956-with a Republican city council and a Republican county council allegedly "pushed
through" consolidation at a time when Republicans controlled both houses of the state
legislature and the governorship. There can be no doubt that considerable political pres-
sure was exerted to get the bill passed, leaving all Republicans open to charges of a power
grab by incumbent Indianapolis leaders. But the incumbent, Mayor Richard G. Lugar, in a
speech before the 34th Annual Conference of the National Association of County Officials
in Portland, Oregon, July 28, 1969, frankly admitted that without this political leadership,
exercised forcefully and quickly, the idea of government reform which had been talked
about for forty-four years in Marion County, and supported by the past Democratic
Mayor, would never have become a reality.
29 Speech by Mayor Richard G. Lugar, 34th Annual Conference of the National Associ-
ation of County Officials, in Portland, Oregon, July 28, 1969.
30 CITY, June, 1969, at 39.
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"at large" seats on the Council is an overt attempt by white
residents to make sure the influence of black councilmen is min-
imal.31 Proponents of UNIGOV maintain that as many as eight or
nine districts may elect black representatives and that the black
population will have, therefore, more vocal leaders than was the
case before UNIGOV when inter-party agreements assured the
presence of only one black representative on the City Council.
Inner city spokesmen are also met with the argument that in-
heriting the inner city and electing a black mayor would be a
Pyrrhic victory if white citizens and their resources had migrated
to the suburbs.
32
Regardless of the merit in the assertions that metropolitan
government is anti-black and that the suburbs will "control" the
new city, these objections to UNIGOV do raise the specter of
frustration and powerlessness among poorer inner city residents.
However one approaches the complexities of metropolitan gov-
ernment, whether in Indianapolis or in any other city, eventually a
centralized area-wide government must be reconciled with the
need for community identification and the desire of minority
groups to control events in their community.33 Weldon Rougeau,
field director of the Voter Education Project of the Southern
Regional Council based in Atlanta, finds it
disquieting that liberals are gung-ho for metro without taking
into account all of its effects, without asking the important
questions: How about the people who have been neglected?
How is this going to help them? Are they still going to have
to litigate to buy homes in the suburbs? [Ultimately] satellite
communities must be brought into some metropolitan form of
government with the central cities. But people who live in the
cities have to have a decisive voice.3 4
Centralization of governments in large urban areas such as
Indianapolis may help establish a framework for dealing with
problems that require regional solutions. Instead of specialized
authorities competing for limited financial resources, a large urban
government integrates, plans and establishes priorities for an
entire region. Ideally, the voters will determine who will run that
government, and, in turn, what those priorities will be. Unfortu-
nately, there is no indication that regional elections will result in
directing the efforts of the elected body toward the resolution of
31 Lawrence & Turnbull, supra note 15, at 25.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 CITY, June, 1969, at 40.
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the staggering problems facing cities. 3 5 Simply because more
people, and theoretically more resources, have been organized
under one governmental unit does not necessarily mean that the
government can more effectively resolve peculiarly local prob-
lems. Not only is it possible that the more affluent and politically
sophisticated will in fact continue to have a disproportionate
influence on resource allocation under a centralized government,
but it is also possible that disadvantaged elements in the city will
believe that the larger, more remote government is controlled by
alien citizens and thereby give up all attempts to influence local
policy.
In short, centralization offers no guarantee that a more rigorous
attempt will be made to solve particular problems of housing,
employment, education, redevelopment, and physical protection
of persons and property in the inner city. That challenge is so
great that neighborhoods and communities must be encouraged to
articulate their problems and to unite in an effort to formulate
solutions. To achieve desired goals, and successfully attack urban
ills, meaningful participation is required of small communities.
One method of transferring decision-making to small units of
people is the creation of community development corporations.
B. Community Development Corporations
In response to community needs and problems, a few inner city
groups have turned to non-profit community development corpo-
rations (CDC), owned and operated by inner city residents, as a
means of developing social, economic and political resources
within indigenous areas. The exact operational form assumed by
such community corporations varies with the manner in which
membership in the corporation is determined, the purposes of the
corporation, and the manner in which the corporation obtains
funds. Generally, the investors include only residents of the cor-
poration's "jurisdiction." The corporation is governed by a board
of directors, elected from the residents of the community or the
investors in the corporation. Capital funds for the corporation
may also be obtained from private philanthropic groups and the
federal government.
Although it is difficult to generalize about the goals and pur-
poses of CDC's, they are usually intended to provide both social
35 For example, it is unclear that a larger governmental unit with county-wide jurisdic-
tion will give greater aid to an inner city neighborhood confronted with the problems
incident to an urban renewal project than was given by a city council before. The concept
of centralization offers no inherent advantage to the poor inner city resident seeking
adequate housing, education or employment.
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services for residents of the community and stimulation of eco-
nomic development by investment in local business. One author
has described the hopes for community development corporations
as a
means of ending the ghetto's dependence on outside aid by
generating enough revenue to provide significant short-run
services to the community in addition to creating enduring
resources to end the depressed state of the ghetto. At the
same time they are seen as creating community pride and
other psychological rewards, in addition to insuring the sensi-
tivity of programs to community values, through community
control of the corporation.36
Recently, an act has been introduced in the national legislature
designed to foster the creation of CDC's on a national scale.
3 7
The bill would create a National Community Certification Board
which would have the authority to grant federal charters and to
provide initial appropriations for creation of CDC's in commu-
nities where the standard of living is very low.3 8 The CDC would
be managed by an elected board of directors" and a business
management board (BMB) appointed by the board of directors. 40
Voting membership would be given to each resident that pur-
chased a five-dollar share of stock. 41
The BMB would be responsible for the investment of corpo-
ration funds, primarily in local businesses, and would determine
the percentage of the profits the CDC would devote to such social
services as child day-care centers, job training centers and recrea-
tional facilities. 42
This bill has stimulated much discussion about the goals and
priorities of community-level corporations. One author has con-
cluded that legislation creating community development corpo-
rations should be concerned less with "community support for
and participation in development effort" and more intent on fos-
tering economically-sound, job-producing business enterprises in
36 Note, Community Development Corporations: Operations and Financing, 83 HARV.
L. REV. 1558, 1560 (1970).
37 H.R. 6738, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969); S. 33, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); H.R.
18709, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); S. 3876, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968) (all versions are
identical).
38 Id. §§ 103, 138. The standard of living in the community, computed on the basis of
median income and employment statistics, must be substantially below the national or
metropolitan average. The bill provides in § 110(b) that a community have no less than
five thousand residents and no more than 300,000.
3 9 1d. § 112.
4 0 Id. § 113.
41 Id. §§ 11 (b), 132(a)(5).
42 Id. §§ 110(a), 119.
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poverty areas.43 Others have suggested that legislation should not
subordinate community organization and citizen participation to
economic development.44 Indeed, the whole idea of using the
corporate form as a means of self-help in inner-city neighborhoods
has been questioned by those who feel that poor citizens will have
neither the interest nor the money to participate in a corporation
over which they will have limited control and from which they
will receive few tangible benefits. 45
Although a lively discussion continues about the purposes of
community development corporations, in fact, few community de-
velopment corporations have been formed. Moreover, the CDC's
in existence have had limited success in achieving any of their
goals.4 6 There are several possible reasons why community cor-
porations experience severe operational problems. First, the cor-
poration may initially encounter a shortage of both entrepre-
neurial skills and necessary capital. If the corporation does begin
operations, it is likely that a lack of experienced management and
the employment of mostly unskilled or inefficient labor may keep
the corporation from flourishing unless it can attract a continuous
flow of outside financial and entrepreneurial resources. Finally,
even if the enterprise stays in existence, it may be difficult to
support community services or substantial economic devel-
opment. These factors seem to have hindered the corporations in
attracting capital to the ghetto and thereby providing residents
with tangible benefits. 47 Furthermore, the goal of citizen participa-
tion in CDC's has not been realized. Acquiring capital from
outside sources has had the effect of limiting local control of the
corporation and its activities.48 Also, in part because the benefits
of CDC's have not been great, local residents have demonstrated
a simple lack of interest in the success of the corporation.
49
43 Note, The Inner-City Development Corporation, 55 VA. L. REV. 872, 906-7 (1969).
The Note contends that projects like the Bedford-Stuyvesant Restoration Program in New
York, which combines an appointed board of local residents with an appointed board of
powerful representatives of business and politics, have the best chance of drawing capital
and jobs into the ghetto. See id. at 885-895 for a summary of the Bedford-Stuyvesant
project which was established in 1967 largely through the work of the late Senator Robert
Kennedy.
4 Note, Community Development Corporations: A New Approach To The Poverty
Problem, 82 HARV L. REV. 644, 665 (1969).
45 Id. at 649-656; Goodpaster, An Introduction To The Community Development Cor-
poration, 46 J. URBAN L. 603, 662-3 (1969).
4 Community Development Corporations: Operations and Financing, supra note 36.
47 Id. at 1576-77.
48 Id. at 1577-82.
4 Evidence of this is presented in a recent survey of cities with community development
corporations which shows that most CDC decisions are made by very small numbers of
people. Id. at 1576.
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As a result of these problems, several critics of community
development corporations have suggested that citizen participa-
tion in the reconstruction of neighborhoods would better be
achieved through a non-corporate institution, such as a municipal
corporation or other cooperative form in which all residents are
members.50 Having perceived the difficulties encountered by de-
velopment corporations in attempting to facilitate the growth of
community identity and the improvement of economic conditions,
Indiana, through MINIGOV, may turn to a governmental struc-
ture to achieve some of the same goals sought by CDC's.
Instead of an economic approach, the thrust of MINIGOV is
towards political resolution of local problems. MINIGOV is de-
signed to provide a governmental framework in which local prob-
lems can be articulated and hopefully solved without direct com-
mitment of financial resources to specific poverty areas. Also,
MINIGOV is devised to offset the loss of identity of smaller
communities with the advent of UNIGOV by giving to local
groups of people a voice in the determinations affecting their area.
The author of the bill described the purpose of MINIGOV to be
to provide communities the opportunity to organize local councils
to represent truly the interests of their people:
These councils would serve as a forum for communication
among the people of a community, as an influence on those
decisions which affect the people of their community, and as
a voice in the councils of government; they would establish
local community priorities, encourage local individual effort
in solving the problems of the community, encourage citizen
participation in planning and encourage independent orga-
nizations trying to serve the people of the community'
C. Major Provisions of MINIGOV
Stated briefly, the purpose of MINIGOV is to permit local
groups of residents within the city to elect community councils
which may serve as a forum of true local government in their
respective neighborhoods. The councils would be empowered to
enact ordinances relating to specific local functions; to participate
in planning and zoning, including approval of petitions for zoning
variances affecting property within the neighborhood; to approve
projects for urban renewal, redevelopment and rehabilitation; and
to expend funds appropriated by the City-County Council under
50 Community Development Corporations: A New Approach To The Poverty Problem,
supra note 44, at 666-67.
51 Remarks of E. H. Lamkin to Indiana State Legislature Study Committee, Interim
Committee on Local Government, Feb. 19, 1970.
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UNIGOV for improvements within the neighborhood. Addition-
ally, the community council would be recognized as a party in
interest in any proceeding before a city department or agency
affecting the neighborhood or any of its residents.
1. Creation of Communities
After enactment of the bill, the Department of Metropolitan
Development would be required to submit to the City-County
Council a plan for the division of Indianapolis into communities.
52
In proposing the boundaries, the Department would be required
to take into account the following factors: (1) natural boundaries,
such as watercourses, railroads, interstate highways and major
thoroughfares; (2) boundaries of existing school districts; (3) retail
trading patterns; (4) existence and extent of non-governmental
community and neighborhood associations; and (5) other factors
indicating a social, cultural and economic interrelationship within
a geographic area of the city.53 No community could have a
population of less than three thousand nor greater than
twenty-five thousand except where an area of the city had a
separate existence as an incorporated town prior to UNIGOV.
54
After the Department submits the plan to the City-County
Council, the Council must accept or amend it within sixty days, or
in the event the City-County Council does not adopt the plan, the
Department is required to submit a second plan.5 5 If the second
plan is not approved, with or without amendments, the Circuit
Court of Marion County will choose the plan which best follows
the criteria set forth in the Act with respect to boundaries. 56 After
the plan creating the communities is approved, the City-County
Council must realign the ward and precinct boundaries of the city
so that no precinct lies in more than one community.
57
2. Organization of Community Councils
At the city primary election after boundaries have been deter-
mined, voters in each community would have the opportunity to
52 [1969] Ind. House Bill No. 1921, § 2.
53 Id.
U Id.
5 Id. § 3.
56 Id. Section 4 of the bill specifies that after a plan is approved by the City-County
Council, a group of residents in one community may petition to have their area transferred
to another community, but any such transfer would have to be approved by the Council.
Section 5 permits the Metropolitan Development Department to propose changes in
community boundaries after each federal census.
57 Id. § 6.
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determine whether they wish to elect a community council for
their community. This question would be submitted to the voters
in the form of a referendum, and, if passed, 58 a community council
would be elected at the next general municipal election. 59 If the
referendum fails in any community, a subsequent referendum may
be held on the petition of fifty registered voters at any subsequent
municipal primary election.
60
The community councils would be composed of one council-
man from each precinct in the community, the councils to have a
minimum of three members. 61 Candidates would be nominated by
petition 62 and would not run on any party label. 63 Alternate coun-
cilmen would also be elected, to serve in the event the councilmen
should die, resign or move out of the community.6 4 The bill
further provides for a Community Advisory Council, made up of
one member of each community council in the city, which would
meet periodically to discuss common problems, and which would
have the power to designate up to three persons to participate
without vote in the deliberations of the City-County Countil.6
5
3. General Powers of Community Councils
The bill provides that community councils shall possess the
powers currently granted to boards of town trustees in Indiana;
however, the bill also gives the City-County Council authority to
increase or decrease those powers and specifies that the following
powers are denied at the outset: levying and collecting taxes,
issuing general obligation bonds, adopting any regulation or ordi-
nance in conflict with any City-County Council ordinance, ex-
ercising the power of eminent domain, exercising power outside
the community, and annexing territory or changing its bound-
aries. 66 Powers specifically granted to the community council
include the ability to hire its own officials, contract with the city
for special services, additional police and fire protection, commu-
nity improvements, and park and recreational facilities, and enact
58 Id. Section 7 of the bill provides that fifty percent of the total number of persons
voting in the primary must vote on the question, and a majority of those voting thereon
must vote in favor of organizing a community council.
59 Id. § 7.
0 Id. § 8. Presumably, the only motivation for voting "no" in a referendum would be a
desire to express to the City-County Council dissatisfaction with the boundaries drawn for
the community.
61 Id. § 9(a).
62 Id. § 9(b).
63 Id. § 9(c).
6Id.§ 12.
65 Id. § 31.
" Id. § 15.
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ordinances for the regulation of traffic on minor streets within the
community.
6 7
To pay for these services, the City-County Council would be
authorized to appropriate for the use of all community councils
funds from the city's general fund, or could earmark for commu-
nity use a portion of any distribution of funds from the state to the
city. 68 This money would be available to each community council
on a per capita basis,69 and, in areas with no organized commu-
nity, to the City-County Council for strictly local improvements
in the unorganized area.70 These allocations would allow the
communities to establish and finance "local priorities for projects
not sufficiently recognized in importance in the overall county
picture." 7 ' The bill also provides that the community council or
its designated representative would be entitled to represent any
resident of the community or the community itself in any proceed-
ing before a non-judicial board, department, or agency of the
city.72 Finally, the bill specifies the powers granted to commu-
nities over the control of land use planning and development.
73
IV. CITIZEN PARTICIPATION UNDER MINIGOV
While it is beyond the scope of this note to analyze the prob-
able effect of every section of the MINIGOV bill, it is useful to
scrutinize certain sections to see their relation to the goals and
priorities established for community governments. Those sections
of the bill to be discussed deal with land use planning and devel-
opment. Because they show the overriding intent of the drafters to
stimulate the interest and influence of local residents in the new
metropolitan government, without bestowing upon them ultimate
political power, these sections appear especially worthy of dis-
cussion. Although land use planning may not be the most crucial
issue facing a large metropolitan area, individual citizens have
67 Id. §§ 15(3)-(5).
68 Id. § 24.
69 While the authors of the bill recognized that income levels would be markedly
different between communities, it was felt that the cost of providing specific services and
improvements would not fluctuate as widely and would tend to be proportional to the
population and area involved. Remarks of E. H. Lamkin to Indiana State Legislative Study
Committee, Interim Committee on Local Government, Feb. 19, 1970. While these as-
sumptions are subject to argument, the distribution plan is at least better than one
providing for allocation according to the amounts paid into the city funds by different
communities. There is some redistribution of resources from affluent to blighted neighbor-
hoods.
70 [1969] Ind. House Bill No. 1921, § 26.
71 Remarks of E. H. Lamkin to Ind:ana State Legislative Study Committee, Interim
Committee on Local Government, Feb. 19, 1970.
72 [1969] Ind. House Bill 1921, § 16.
73 See text accompanying notes 74-84 infra.
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traditionally had limited influence over it. It is a significant pur-
pose of MINIGOV to increase the amount of community control
over this aspect of municipal government.
MINIGOV attempts to involve in land use planning and devel-
opment the citizens most affected by the process. Traditionally,
land use planning has been effectuated through municipal building,
zoning and housing codes, which have been enacted and enforced
by centralized agencies. 74 The local legislative body normally
approves a comprehensive plan of land use, passes various zoning
ordinances to facilitate the plan, and supplements the plan with
uniform building, health and housing codes. One difficulty with
this centralized enforcement and administration is that local resi-
dents feel that the process is unresponsive to their desires; that it
appears "arbitrary and mechanical." 7 5 Similarly, residents may
resent the apparent ability of large scale landlords, builders or
realtors to deal more effectively with the enforcement agencies. 76
In this regard, one of the most frequently-voiced criticisms is that
comprehensive plans are thwarted by the Zoning Appeals Board,
inconsistently applying the zoning regulations through its grants of
zoning variances. Contending that the lay zoning board fails to
realize the necessity for planned, integrated zoning, some have
advocated allowing only the legislative body, perhaps upon the
recommendation of a board of expert planners, the authority to
grant variances. 77 Another criticism, based largely upon the
findings of empirical studies, that appeal boards pay little attention
to the legal limitations on their powers and operate largely on an
ad hoc basis, has led others to suggest abolishing the board,
replacing it with either a board of experts or a single adminis-
trator, with the right of appeal to a legislative body.7 In this way
it is hoped that the frequent problem of zoning boards granting too
many variances, and thus weakening the comprehensive zoning
scheme, will be avoided.
Contrary to these suggestions, MINIGOV contemplates less
expertise, less recognition for the sanctity of comprehensive
land-use plans, greater community influence over the zoning
scheme, and thus probably more variances. 79 The bill provides
74 Babcock & Bosselman, Citizen Participation: A Suburban Suggestion For The Cen-
tral City, 32 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 220 (1967).
75 Id. at 228.
76 Id. at 229; see also Dukeminier & Stapleton, The Zoning Board of Adjustment: A
Case Study In Misrule, 50 Ky. L. REV. 273, 325 (1962).
77 Note, Zoning Variances, 74 HARM. L. REV. 1396, 1407-08 (1961).
78 Dukeminier & Stapleton, supra note 76, at 350.
79 Although this decentralization of zoning power seems heretical to the teaching of
Euclidian Zoning, the idea has support among modem commentators who feel that the
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that any community council may propose amendments to the
master plan for land use in its community.80 Likewise, a commu-
nity council may propose amendments to any applicable zoning
ordinance for the purpose of changing the zoning classification of
a particular parcel of property located in its community. 8 l Any
petition for rezoning of a parcel of land within the community
must first be submitted to the community council for its consid-
eration and recommendations, which would be forwarded to the
Metropolitan Development Commission.8 2 Finally, the commu-
nity councils are given the power to grant or deny all variances of
use, height, bulk and area from the terms of any zoning ordinance
with respect to any property within an organized community.83
Clearly in the past, especially in regulating the zoning of poorer
areas, the zoning boards have operated largely beyond the control
of local residents, who are uneducated in the subtleties of political
persuasion behind closed doors. By giving the elected community
councils influence over land use, the zoning determinations should
be more responsive to the desires of the residents than to the
pressures of those with money or pclitical influence.8 4
Yet, in all instances where the communities are given a role in
determining land use planning, that role is primarily advisory, and
the decisions of the councils need never be followed. Although
the councils may propose amendments to the master plan and
suggest changes of zoning classifications, the decision on whether
to accept the amendment rests with the Metropolitan Devel-
opment Commission. Moreover, petitions for rezoning must be
first submitted to the community councils, but their recommenda-
tions are not binding on the Commission.
Even though the community councils are given the authority to
grant or deny variances, the bill provides that landowners may
appeal the council decision denying the variance if the expert
from the Metropolitan Development Department recommended
approval of the variance.85 The provision for appeal indicates that
centralized application of zoning ordinances, while possibly adequate for homogeneous,
affluent suburbs, has not worked to improve blighted neighborhoods. BABCOCK & BOSSEL-
MAN, supra note 74, at 220.
80 [1969] Ind. House Bill No. 1921, § 17. The Metropolitan Development Department
must make available qualified staff personnel to prepare such proposed amendments and to
represent the community council in all proceedings.
81 Id. § 18.
82 Id. § 19.
83 Id. 9 20. The community councils are also entitled to the services of a hearing
examiner or staff representative from the Department of Metropolitan Development, who
would be entitled to make a recommended decision.
4 Note, Administrative Discretion in Zoning, 82 HARV. L. REV. 668, 679-80 (1969).
85 [19691 Ind. House Bill No. 1921, § 20(b).
Journal of Law Reform
the authors of the bill considered it more important that no owner
be unjustly denied a variance than that the comprehensive zoning
scheme remain inviolate. Standing alone, this provision seems
difficult to rationalize when the problem with variances has char-
acteristically been that too many are granted, which is destructive
of the zoning plan, and not that individuals are unjustly denied
variances. Although the community councils do not retain ulti-
mate responsibility for determining land use planning and devel-
opment, they should have an important political influence on the
real decision makers, the Metropolitan Development Commission
and ultimately the City-County Council.
8 6
The detailed provisions in MINIGOV allocating the locus of
control over zoning are in sharp contrast to the single, terse
section of the bill dealing with redevelopment and urban renewal.
The bill provides that any project for "urban renewal, redevelop-
ment, rehabilitation, [or] systematic code enforcement" under-
taken by the city must first be approved by the community council
of each area affected, but that the City-County Council can re-
verse a contrary decision of a community council and approve a
project by a simple majority vote.87 The first half of this provision
seems to recognize that part of the problem in the inner city has
been large highway and slum clearance projects, ostensibly de-
signed to help the poor, which have, in fact, burdened the poor to
benefit the middle class. 88 A project planned by the city bureau-
cracy meant to "rehabilitate" an inner city neighborhood may fail
86 At least seven states have enacted statutes intended to liberalize the annexing powers
of municipalities while giving the annexed areas some control over subsequent land use
and development. U.S. ADVISORY COMM. ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, URBAN
AND RURAL AMERICA: POLICIES FOR FUTURE GROWTH 168 (1968). The Washington
statute, for example, provides for the formation in newly annexed areas of "community
municipal corporations" governed by "community councils," which not only have the
power to disapprove the application to any of its territory of new municipal land-use plans,
zoning schemes, subdivision regulations, etc., but also may:
(1) Make recommendations concerning any comprehensive proposal which directly
or indirectly affects the use of property or land within the service area;
(2) Provide a forum for consideration of the conservation, improvement or devel-
opment of property or land within the service area; and
(3) Advise, consult, and cooperate with the legislative authority of the city on any
local matters directly or indirectly affecting the service area. WASH. REV. CODE
§ 35.14.050 (Supp. 1970).
MINIGOV's community councils have no power to annex, but the above experiences of
Washington and other states are examples of the way several jurisdictions have sought to
facilitate the influence of communities in planning and development.
87 [1969] Ind. House Bill No. 1921, § 22. See generally Note, Citizen Participation In
Urban Renewal, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 485 (1966).
8a A. ALTSHULER, COMMUNITY CONTROL 47 (1970). This is the first of a series on the
widespread demand for increased citizen participation in the government of America's
large cities. A noted political scientist, the author presents the arguments for and against
community control and suggests ways of implementing specific reform plans.
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to follow the cultural patterns of that community. The advocates
of MINIGOV apparently believe that the best way to avoid
harmful dislocation is by consulting elected spokesmen for the
neighborhood.8 9 Thus, the section of the MINIGOV bill dealing
with redevelopment and urban renewal provides for a degree of
citizen input in redevelopment plans absent in the past.9 0
However, the second half of this section, providing that a
negative decision by the community council can be "reversed" by
a bare majority of the City-County Council, 91 is analogous to the
sections of the bill dealing with land use since the role of the
community council is rendered merely advisory. Clearly, munici-
pal planning would be ineffective if each indigenous community
should have the ultimate authority to decide whether to enforce
all municipal codes. Furthermore, there are aspects of indivisible
area-wide policy that demand broader decisions and code provi-
sions that are so essential to the health and safety of the munici-
pality that no group should be allowed to prevent uniform com-
pliance. 92  One can easily imagine, for example, racially-
homogeneous communities barring all public housing or rehabili-
tation projects which threatened integration, if each community
were given the final power to decide when the city should under-
take such programs.
Short of this extreme, however, citizen response in affected
neighborhoods should be given considerable weight, which is, in
89 This is not a novel idea, and several political bodies have tried to tap citizei opinions
about proposed development projects. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 125.74(2)(c)
(Supp. 1970). This statute is an attempt by the Michigan State Legislature to define the
extent of citizen participation by a statute providing for the selection of district councils
mandated to serve as a liaison between the city and local citizens in the formulation and
execution of renewal plans. This statute is similar to HUD's attempt to assure active
citizen response. RENEWAL ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPT. OF HoUSING &
URBAN DEVELOPMENT, URBAN RENEWAL HANDBOOK § 7217, 1, c.5, § 2 (Feb. 1969). All
these provisions are written in broad terms with a conspicuous absence of specific legal
remedies. See generally Rhodes, Michigan's Participation Statute, 1970 URBAN L. ANN.
231.
90 The City-County Council must also solicit community views before undertaking any
project involving "systematic code enforcement," which can mean almost any kind of
coordinated governmental action. Taken in its usual context of building and housing codes,
the provision might be of questionable wisdom if community councils were in fact given a
veto power over all city plans (which they are not). For example, one investigatory body
has recommended uniform building codes designed to take into account new developments
in construction techniques and building materials. U.S. ADVISORY COMM. ON IN-
TERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, BUILDING CODES: A PROGRAM FOR IN-
TERGOVERNMENTAL REFORM 82-3 (1966). This group maintains that the thousands of
building codes existing at the local level impede construction of low-cost, high-volume
housing. If by "systematic code enforcement" the bill is referring to housing codes only,
there may be some justification for varying standards between communities since the
physical conditions in those areas vary so widely. Note, Enforcement of Municipal
Housing Codes, 78 HARV. L. REV. 801, 812 (1965).
91 [1969] Ind. House Bill No. 1921, § 22.
92 BABCOCK & BOSSELMAN, supra note 74, at 226.
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essence, what MINIGOV provides. Community councils do not
have a veto power over the city's urban renewal plans. Theo-
retically, the Mayor and a majority on the City-County Council
could proceed with urban renewal projects despite the disapproval
of elected representatives of the affected area. Practically and
politically, a decision to proceed with plans unacceptable to the
affected area would be very difficult to make. Not only would the
discussion and hearings of the community council about proposed
projects serve as a focus for public objections, but the result of
council deliberations would serve as a referendum that higher
elected officials would hesitate to challenge. This would be partic-
ularly true if several neighborhoods, representing a significant
element of the population, joined together in opposition to a
contemplated project. The Mayor would not want to evoke the
wrath of a segment of his constituency, and both the Mayor and
the City-County Councilmen outside the affected area might have
a hard time explaining to their voters why it was necessary to
force a decision on communities that had clearly and democrat-
ically expressed disapproval.
Establishing community councils carries significant implications
for the expression of concern by citizens in inner city neighbor-
hoods on a broad range of issues, not limited to the urban renew-
al, redevelopment and rehabilitation questions just mentioned.
Certainly, the Mayor and City-County Council would not want to
alienate a segment of the population, whatever the source of
disagreement. Furthermore, community councils consisting of
elected representatives would listen to the diverse complaints,
problems and ideas of their constituents. Before UNIGOV, the
local resident had only a mayor and some councilmen elected at
large from the whole city to go to with a problem. After UNI-
GOV, he has a mayor and a city-county councilman elected
from his district. MINIGOV adds a more responsive representa-
tive-a representative elected from a small homogeneous neigh-
borhood with which the local resident can identify. While before,
the resident with a problem might press his case with a remote
legislator, MINIGOV contemplates that he will be able to take
his case to a body that is closer to the problem, closer to the
person having the problem, and more responsive to individual
ideas. An inner city resident who has been frustrated by a lack of
access to elected officials and who has given up expressing him-
self may find in MINIGOV at least a partial answer to his
personal problems and concerns.
Two final aspects of the MINIGOV bill should be mentioned
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because of the relevance they may have to community land use
planning. First, the section of the bill enumerating the general
powers of community councils provides that community councils
are forbidden to enter into any agreement or receive funds from
any unit of government other than the city and its departments
without prior approval of the City-County Council.93 While this is
an unambiguous prohibition against receipt of funds from the
federal sources available to community development corpo-
rations, it is nevertheless conceivable that communities could
generate development funds from private sources unless the
City-County Council should vote otherwise. One can imagine, for
example, that well-organized inner city communities with strong
council leadership might attract funds from various foundations
interested in problems of black citizens, much as community
development corporations have done. By thereby supplementing
the funds already provided by the City-County Council, poorer
communities might establish an economic base from which to
resolve some ghetto problems.
Underlying this discussion of community councils in their land
use role is the implicit belief that somehow neighborhood-size
groups should be encouraged to participate in the decision-making
process. This belief is best conveyed by the provision which gives
the community council or its representative the right to represent
any resident of the community, or be heard as a party in interest
in any proceeding affecting the community or any of its residents,
before any non-judicial board, department or agency of the city.9 4
In this section, the proponents of MINIGOV have clearly articu-
lated their belief that genuine neighborhood involvement on a
regular basis is better than the informal and disorganized partici-
pation, often prompted only by large, potentially disruptive proj-
ects, that has characterized neighborhood groups in the past.9 5
Community councils are to be cohesive enough to participate in
non-judicial hearings as representatives of the whole community,
but, small enough so that individuals will be encouraged to come
to them for help.
These are some of the "powers" conferred upon community
councils by MINIGOV. Some will argue, with justification, that
any semblance of real power is merely illusory and that MIN-
93 [1969] Ind. House Bill No. 1921, § 15(l)(g).
94 Id. § 16.
95 The American Law Institute has recently proposed a somewhat similar way of
involving neighborhood organizations in land use decisions by allowing qualified organi-
zations to participate in hearings, receive notices, and bring judicial proceedings. ALI
MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE § 2-307 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1970).
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IGOV tends only to stimulate the political "influence" of commu-
nities. Every act by a community council is subject to the control
of the legislative body of the whole city. Furthermore, fiscal
restraint by the City-County Council puts severe limits on any
community program. Nevertheless, at a time when the city gov-
ernment has been centralized through UNIGOV, which governs
the entire urban area, this small step toward decentralization
may be crucial, not only for civic leaders anxious to know the
feelings of their constituents, but also for the individual wanting to
have an impact, however small, on his government. 96
V. Two-TIERED URBAN GOVERNMENT
Indianapolis has initiated urban governmental reform in an
attempt to provide a functional two-tiered approach to urban
problems combining the seemingly contradictory theories of cen-
tralization and community control. Many of the overlapping lay-
ers of local government which had contributed to fragmentation of
the tax base, inefficiency, and lack of responsible political control
over a maze of boards and authorities have been eliminated. This
kind of modernization has been urged as a necessary step toward
solving area-wide problems in a systematic and practical man-
ner.97 Yet, proponents of city-county consolidation, or any other
plan to create metropolitan government and large-scale unity
within the community, have recognized the possible liabilities of
citizen alienation and isolation from a larger, centralized govern-
ment. 98
From this realization have sprung the various proposals for a
two-tiered approach to urban government: granting certain local
powers to neighborhood-size units while creating a larger, consoli-
dated urban governing body. The Committee for Economic De-
velopment has recently urged adoption of a community-level gov-
96 One commentator has described a neighborhood-level board of enforcement this way:
"The neighborhood Board would serve as a forum not only to enforce compliance but to
dispense benefits. It would provide an arena for debate and decision making by low- and
middle-income tenants and landowners that would be more accessible to them than the
distant and little understood machinery at City Hall." BABCOCK & BOSSELMAN, supra note
74, at 228.
9 7
See COMM. FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, MODERNIZING LOCAL GOVERNMENT,
supra note 4.
98 For a persuasive argument that large urban bureaucracies are unable to solve the
problems that face our cities, see Goodpaster, supra note 45, at 604-608. The author
contends that as a bureaucratic organization increases in size, it tends to become stagnant
and unresponsive to individual needs; therefore, it is argued that new institutions are
needed which will increase citizen participation, legitimize authority, and solve urban
problems.
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ernment system, sharing functions with area-wide government 9
Similarly, the United States Advisory Commission on Inter-
governmental Relations has recommended establishing subunits
of metropolitan government with limited taxation and
self-government powers, including the administration of certain
federal, state and local programs.' 00
The proposal of MINIGOV does not extend nearly as far as
these suggestions. Instead of governing power, MINIGOV gives
only advisory influence and authority to the local communities.
Thus the question is raised whether Indianapolis will have, after
MINIGOV, a functional two-tiered government. The answer is
probably no. While UNIGOV was a bold step toward centralized
metropolitan government, the MINIGOV bill provides for the
decentralization of far fewer governmental responsibilities. After
so recently uniting a fragmented and archaic government, it is as if
city leaders are reluctant to reverse the process and are more
willing to wait and see how communities respond to this initial
invitation to exercise leadership.
The MINIGOV bill is, however, stimulating the involvement
of neighborhood-level institutions-institutions which are being
asked to participate for the first time formally in a wide range of
governmental functions. The political influence of these groups is
openly recognized and encouraged, in the hope that the traditional
kinds of covert activities will decrease. Furthermore, this grass-
roots leadership will provide the real decision-makers, the mem-
bers of the City-County Council, with important information
about citizen feelings, wants and desires.
MINIGOV may also help to some extent to chip away at the
cynicism surrounding what is often perceived as a remote and
impersonal city government. Community councils may have little
formal power to control zoning enforcement, to upgrade housing,
or to stop a renewal project that the City-County Council is
convinced is needed, but at least the citizen's influence over such
matters may be increased. However, while MINIGOV attempts
to deal with access to elected representatives, it fails to respond to
the citizen's need to relate to the increasingly large city bureau-
cracy responsible for the every-day problems of urban living. A
local resident can take complaints to a community council, but if
the problem involves a strictly municipal function, a city service
99COMM. FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, RESHAPING GOVERNMENT IN METROPOLI-
TAN AREAS, supra note 7, at 19.
100 2 U.S. ADVISORY COMM. ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, FISCAL BALANCE
IN THE AMERICAN FEDERAL SYSTEM 16 (1967).
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for example, the citizen would have to act on his own to obtain
relief. It is these.attempts to obtain municipal services-like hav-
ing the garbage picked up, the chuck hole in the alley filled, and
police help provided to find out who menaced the child in the
park-which provide the experiences that determine the thoughts
and actions of citizens towards local governments.
In part, Indianapolis has already reacted to the need for re-
sponse to citizen complaints by providing a staff of telephone
operators working directly from the Mayor's office. 10 1 This pro-
cess is no doubt an improvement over the frustrating prospect of a
citizen trying to locate the responsible department by himself and
to persuade the administrative official to act and to do so
promptly. Nevertheless, the authors of MINIGOV could have
contributed much to the process of breaking down an impersonal
bureaucracy by delegating to community level some responsibility
for these administrative functions that figure so heavily in the
lives of inner city residents.
Any such delegation of administrative authority would, how-
ever, necessitate some kind of provision for a technical staff that
could serve the community council in its dealings with citizens
and city officials. MINIGOV does not do so except for the
limited power granted to a community council by section 15(3)
"to hire its own clerk and to hire other officials permitted by
ordinance of the [City-County] Council." Of even greater impor-
tance is the fact that communities lack the power to provide
independently for an investigative staff able to sensitize the coun-
cils to the problems of their constituents and inform them of the
possibilities for cooperation with other levels of government. All
information would seem to come from the city government, as is
the case under the land use sections of MINIGOV which provide
community councils with "experts" from the Department of Met-
ropolitan Development. The community councils will be forced to
operate with minimal investigatory resources and inadequate tools
with which to resolve complaints. Under such circumstances, it is
difficult to foresee community councils developing imaginative
responses to constituents' problems. If the community councils
are to properly serve even a limited advisory role, they must be
given personnel who are responsible to them as local agents and
not responsible to the central administrative structure.
Because MINIGOV is aimed primarily at political rather than
101 In 1968 Indianapolis established a central complaint number which is well publicized
throughout the city. Complaints are received and channeled by the Mayor's Office to the
responsible department. After a reasonable amount of time, the citizen is called by the
complaint operators to see if his problem has been solved, and reports are kept on the
efficiency of the city departments in responding favorably to citizen complaints.
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economic problems, community councils, unlike community de-
velopment corporations, are not meant to have significant eco-
nomic leverage in dealing with physical blight, unemployment,
inadequate housing and poor education. The provisions of MIN-
IGOV dealing with financial powers specifically prohibit commu-
nity councils from seeking governmental funds to supplement the
undoubtedly limited amounts provided by the City-County Coun-
cil. However, by giving community councils such limited financial
tools, the MINIGOV bill severely limits any chance those coun-
cils might have to solve the most pressing urban problems on their
own. This reflects the attitude that the recently created metropoli-
tan government is better equipped to marshal the resources of the
area and provide the framework necessary to solve the problems
faced by a large metropolitan area. The community councils are
intended to serve only as an adjunct to that system.
The granting of political power to many communities within the
urban area involves a certain amount of inefficiency, the very
antithesis of schemes like UNIGOV. 102 Nevertheless, it is clear
that even good government advocates would exchange a little
efficiency for a decrease in the isolation, frustration and dis-
content too often a part of inner city life.' 03 A certain price will
have to be paid for community activism and citizen involvement.
Community councils are meant to encourage inner city residents
to make their problems known, to stimulate their interest and
confidence in the new metropolitan government, and to make that
government responsive to citizen needs. MINIGOV gives very
little power or money to community councils, but it may help poor
communities develop a voice in dealing with the City-County
Council. If enough communities become politically active and
exert enough pressure, the City-County Council may respond
with the resources needed to provide adequate housing and trans-
portation, to provide enough job training and jobs, and to furnish
poor citizens with the city services that might previously have
been reserved for politically powerful, affluent groups.
Whatever its impact, if MINIGOV is enacted by the Indiana
Legislature, the Indianapolis system of urban government reform
will serve as a much needed test of decentralization in the context
of fostering community involvement in a large consolidated met-
ropolitan government.
-Charles T. Richardson
102 Wildavsky, The Empty-head Blues: Black Rebellion and White Reaction, I 1 THE
PUBLIC INTEREST 3, 12 (1968).
103 A. ALTSHULER, supra note 88, at 140.
